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Abstract—Authenticating websites is an ongoing problem for
users. Recent proposals have suggested strengthening current
server authentication methods by incorporating website location
as a comprehensible additional trust factor. In this work, we
explore users’ acceptance of location information and how it
affects decision-making for security and privacy. We conducted
a series of qualitative interviews to learn how location can
be integrated into users’ decision-making for security, and we
designed a security indicator to alert the user to changes in
website locations. We evaluated our tool in a 44-participant user
study and found that users were less likely to perform security-
sensitive tasks when alerted to location changes. Our results
suggest that website location can be used as an effective indicator
for users’ security assessments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Users’ increasing reliance on the Internet for critical ser-
vices, such as banking, data storage, and communication, high-
lights the importance of data security and privacy. However,
users can currently do little to ascertain whether their security
is ensured and their privacy is respected by online services.
Users’ trust in websites is strongly tied to the problem of
server authentication, which is currently achieved using public
key certificates and browser security warnings. Unfortunately,
research has found that users frequently ignore or bypass
related warnings, exposing themselves to online threats [4], [5],
[34]. Users also often fail to notice or understand certificate
information [33], [13], which has been partly addressed with
improved interface design [15], [14], [35], [31].
Recent research on strengthening server authentication has
proposed using the servers geographic location as an additional
trust factor [2], [39]. These proposals integrate web server
location into the TLS protocol to increase the security of
server authentication, but they require the user to assess and
decide whether these locations are trustworthy in situations
where the protocol fails (similar to current implementations
of certificates). Although there are techniques to display infor-
mation about server locations, it remains unexplored how such
information should be presented and how users would react to
it when they make security decisions.
In this paper, we explore users’ decision-making processes
regarding their security when they are provided with the loca-
tion information of websites. Our goal is to better understand
how the proposed website localization techniques will affect
users. Using a user-centered design approach, we gathered
requirements, designed a location indicator, and evaluated its
usability and effect on security decision making.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 partici-
pants and applied thematic analysis to identify issues relevant
to online trust. Based on our themes, we developed a model
to describe the factors in users’ trust and analyzed the role
of website locations in their decisions. We found that users’
perceptions of online security and web authenticity are often
intermixed with their concerns about privacy. Our participants
often assessed their security on a conceptual level by gauging
their risks in terms of financial security and personal privacy.
We also found that participants, while describing various trust
concerns about their online security, expressed preferences for
particular locations when dealing with sensitive information or
transactions. These findings suggest that the website location is
a tangible concept and such knowledge affects users’ security
decisions.
Based on the qualitative analysis, we derived requirements
for a location tool to inform users of website locations. We
designed and implemented LocationWatch, a Chrome exten-
sion that makes website locations available to users and alerts
them to changes in server locations. Using LocationWatch,
we conducted a user study with 44 participants to analyze how
website locations affect their security decisions. Our statistical
analysis showed that participants’ decisions were significantly
affected by website locations, with fewer users completing
sensitive tasks when the website location had changed. The
participants’ decisions also varied depending on the sensitivity
of data in different application scenarios.
The effects of website location knowledge on users’
decision-making processes have not been investigated until
now. With recent proposals for strengthening authentication
using website locations, it is important to evaluate how this
information is perceived by users and how it can be best
leveraged in their decision-making processes. Our results show
that users are sensitive to website locations when informed in
a non-intrusive way. This shows the promise of using location
information as an additional factor to improve user security
and privacy.
II. BACKGROUND
Current research on location-based website authentication
raises the question of how users might leverage such location
information in decision-making. Compared to digital certifi-
cates, the tangibility of location and its clear relationship to
the real world suggest that location can play a role in users’
security and privacy awareness.
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A. Location-based Decision-Making
Psychological research on decision-making has found that
people tend to underestimate risk. Since safety and security
are abstract concepts, users are unmotivated to pay attention
to these risks. Research examining how users make decisions
about computer security has found that users reason incon-
sistently about their gains and losses, and are likely to over-
prioritize the cost of losses [38]. For security, because the gains
are abstract and the consequences seem random, users often
focus on costs, which are immediate and tangible [38]. Users
may consider gains, such as protecting information, money,
and property, but that they are unaware of risks relating to
money and property loss online [20]. Users are also concerned
about personal inconvenience in using online services.
Users’ security decisions often serve to protect their per-
sonal privacy. Research has found that users’ privacy prefer-
ences are context-dependent and can be easily influenced [3].
Users also experience high uncertainty about whether and to
what extent they should be concerned about data privacy.
Human decision-making can appear inconsistent, but it is
governed by a complex calculus of decision-making [25] that
factors in additional information such as social norms and
emotional responses.
Recently, Ruoti et al. [29] explored how people determine
the security measures they use to protect their online activities.
They conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with middle-
aged residents in Washington state and found that users were
often pragmatic about their security decisions due to the
appreciation of the convenience brought by the Internet. They
also found that users often have misconceptions of existing
TLS security indicators, resulting in insecure behaviors that
put their privacy at risk.
Little research to date has analyzed users’ perceptions of
where their data is stored or to what locations it is transmitted
over the Internet. Kang et al. [23] conducted a qualitative study
investigating users’ mental models of the Internet and found
that users had only a vague understanding of where data is
stored online. They also found that factors such as reputation
and appearance were likely to influence users’ perceptions of
what was happening to their data. Ion et al. [21] interviewed
users about their data privacy awareness and their attitudes
about where their online data should be kept. They found that
users generally preferred sensitive data to be stored locally
than uploaded to cloud storage. They also identified cultural
differences that affect users’ understanding and preference for
their online privacy. A large-scale study of website credibil-
ity [17] found that websites were more believable when they
communicated the “real world” aspect of the organization,
were professional and easy to use, and included indicators
of trustworthiness. It remains unexplored how users might
integrate information about the website’s location into their
evaluation of these environmental cues.
B. Website Location and Authentication
Websites are currently authenticated using TLS, which
requires the server to have a valid X.509 public-key certifi-
cate [11]. The client’s browser must validate this certificate
upon connection to the server by checking a certificate author-
ity’s (CA) signature and other fields. However, recent incidents
have demonstrated the weaknesses of public key infrastructure
against a strong adversary [27]. More specifically, attackers
have been able to compromise CAs to obtain a fraudulent
certificate of an arbitrary website to impersonate it. Such at-
tacks have been addressed by a wide range of enhancements to
TLS authentication, such as Certificate Transparency [24], and
pinning [32]. Despite improvements to certificate validation, a
strong attacker may still be able to compromise a web server
and obtain the private key associated with the public key in its
certificate, e.g., by exploiting TLS implementation bugs [1] or
zero-day vulnerabilities. In these scenarios, server imperson-
ation attacks can be performed remotely by the adversary that
controls the network.
Recent work has proposed using website location as an
additional authentication factor to strengthen website authen-
tication. Verifying a server’s location during authentication
detects remote server impersonation attacks resulting from
the compromise of CAs or websites’ private keys. Yu et al.
proposed adding location information to digital certificates to
authenticate servers in TLS handshakes [39]. In this approach,
a trusted party estimates the location of a website server and
issue a signed statement binding the server location to a partic-
ular connection with the client. The browser can either perform
automatic verification (e.g., during the TLS handshake) of the
location information or directly display it to the user. Abdou
and van Oorschot proposed similar methods of augmenting
TLS by actively estimating website locations using delay-based
measurements from multiple locations [2]. These approaches
leverage the uniqueness and verifiability of private web server
locations to supplement existing server authentication.
Using location as an authentication factor is increasingly
possible due to the availability of pervasive location informa-
tion, IP geolocation services, and general localization tech-
niques. A non-technical approach to website localization is the
use of public ledgers to record and make available the location
of data centers. Online services often host their web servers
in data centers, whose locations are publicly known. For
example, online resources such as Data Center Knowledge [28]
provide a public listing of data center deployment and news
about web hosting companies. Companies are also increasingly
disclosing their server locations to the public [18], [6], and
using on-site security to protect critical online services from
physical intrusion by malicious parties [19], [36]. In addition
to out-of-band channels, CAs can also verify the locations
of online firms and store them in Extended Validation (EV)
certificates [10], which can be extracted by the browser.
Currently, IP geolocation is the most common source
of website location data. There also already exist software
solutions showing IP geolocation data to users, such as Flag-
fox [12] and IP Whois & Flags [26]. However, they do not
guarantee that the web servers really are at these locations
upon client connection.
In general, with these website location solutions, users are
called upon to notice location information and react appropri-
ately. The impact to users’ security awareness and decisions
has not been explored in depth.
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III. RESEARCH OVERVIEW
Given recent trends in data localization and proposals for
location-based authentication, we aim to explore how server
location information can be leveraged as a part of users’ trust
in online services.
Since we are investigating users’ involvement with location
information, we inherit the same attacker model proposed in
related work on TLS [11] and website location authentica-
tion [2], [39]. Specifically, we assume that the attacker is
able to impersonate the server by compromising its public key
certificate, e.g., by obtaining a fraudulent certificate from a
compromised CA or learning the server’s private key. We also
inherit the assumption that the remote attacker is unable to
physically co-locate with the victim’s website and resides in a
separate location. The attacker’s goals may consist of stealing
user data (e.g., passwords, credit card numbers, or personal
files) or providing false information (e.g., fake news). We
specifically aimed to answer the following research questions
about user behavior.
RQ1 How do users currently make online security decisions
and how could location play a role in these decisions?
RQ2 Does information about website locations affect users’
behavior when they perform online tasks?
We explored these problems using a user-centered ap-
proach [22]. To answer RQ1, we conducted a series of qual-
itative interviews and applied thematic analysis to understand
users’ decision-making processes for online security. The
themes we identified allowed us to develop a model of users’
trust assessments and derive design requirements for a website
location tool for a broad range of web users. To answer RQ2,
we designed a location tool that displays web server locations,
which we implemented as a Chrome browser extension. We
conducted a user study to evaluate the usability of our location
tool and analyze the impact of location information on users’
decisions in real-world application settings. All studies involv-
ing human subjects were approved by the ethics committee in
our institution.
IV. STUDY 1: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS
We first interviewed users about how they currently de-
termine websites’ trustworthiness. Our goal was to understand
how location information could fit into users’ decision-making
practices and to identify design requirements for a location
indicator.
A. Study Design
We chose a semi-structured interview approach to ensure
that we covered topics of interest while giving participants
the freedom to discuss their decision-making processes and
concerns. Our interview covered three areas: Internet use,
security awareness, and location-related preferences. We care-
fully selected topics that might have associated security or
privacy concerns for different Internet usage scenarios: online
file storage, emails and calendars, online financial transactions
(banking and shopping), and social media. For each topic, we
asked about how participants used these services, the kinds of
data they stored or obtained through those services, and what
kinds of security and privacy concerns they had around these
activities. Regarding security awareness, we asked participants
about their general security and privacy precautions and where
they thought Internet data was stored and served from. Because
we were interested in the development of a security indicator,
we asked about how they currently determine that websites
are legitimate or trustworthy. In the final part of our interview,
we explained the concept of website location as a security
indicator, and asked participants how they might use it if
it were available.1 Our interview script can be found in the
appendix.
Because using location as a website security indicator is
a novel concept, we did not expect participants to explic-
itly identify it during the interviews. We therefore framed
our interview broadly and encouraged discussion on a wide
range of topics with relevant security and privacy concerns.
By eliciting detailed feedback about users’ current decision-
making strategies, we sought to understand how location is
currently perceived and how it can be used in users’ security
decisions. Rather than specifically introducing technical con-
cepts of location-based authentication, we introduced topics
that naturally led to the subject of location. If participants did
not bring up the subject of location on their own, we attempted
to steer the conversation in that direction.
We audio-recorded the interviews to facilitate subsequent
note-taking and transcription for analysis. Participants also
completed a brief demographic questionnaire before the in-
terview. Each interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes.
B. Participants
We aimed to represent a diverse array of perspectives and
therefore recruited people of different genders, ages, education
levels, occupations, and diverse nationalities. We deliberately
advertised outside our institution using public bulletin boards,
online forums, and mailing lists. While our sample is likely
not representative of the larger population, a wide variety of
viewpoints were expressed in our interviews. The perspectives
and experiences expressed by our participants were in line with
the results of similar studies [23], [16].
We reached saturation at 15 participants (8 female, 7 male).
They ranged in age from 20 to 59, with most (13) aged between
20 and 39 years old. Participants had a variety of educational
backgrounds, and their areas of specialty or occupation in-
cluded social and natural sciences, engineering/informatics,
and healthcare. Their occupations included artist, scientist, and
student (with 8 students making up the majority). To provide
a rough measure of the participants’ level of international
experience, we asked participants for their nationality, and
how many countries they had visited. Participants’ nationalities
spanned 12 countries, and each participant had visited a
median of 10 countries.
C. Thematic Analysis
We reviewed the audio recordings and transcribed each
interview. This produced a qualitative dataset that we analyzed
using thematic analysis [8], a flexible qualitative analysis
1To make it easier for the participants to understand, we used the term
“website locations” in our user studies. We use the terms “website locations”
and “server locations” interchangeably throughout the rest of the paper.
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methodology that allowed us to identify themes and relation-
ships in the data. We began our analysis with open coding.
We traversed and reviewed the transcriptions line by line and
assigned codes to recurring ideas. To ensure consistency, each
interview was coded by two researchers, and codes were cross-
checked to improve reliability.
An example of our open coding is shown in the following
quote, where a participant was asked how she verifies website
authenticity:
“I didn’t think of [authenticating websites] before. I
think every website will give us some legal docu-
ments to read before we give information to them. I
will scan the documents.” – P5
We assigned the code lack of awareness to highlight the partic-
ipant’s lack of concern. Because she mentioned her attention
to legal documents, we assigned the code legal concern. We
identified 46 open codes in our data. Following the process
of open coding, we refined the codes and classified them into
themes, described in the subsequent sections. These themes
highlight patterns of typical behavior, rather than representing
categories of users.
1) Trusting by Default: When asked about their online
decision-making, many participants described taking the se-
curity of websites for granted without much investigation.
“You just go to the webpage, it looks familiar, and
then it never crosses your mind that it may have been
forged.” – P12
We also noticed users’ default approach to trust in the way
they described their automatic use of various online services,
such as synchronization of data (e.g., contacts and files) across
different devices linked to the same platform.
“I do use sometimes iCloud. I think it just come
automatically with my iPhone. Each two weeks,
asking me if I want to store it [...] I just let it.” – P1
Many participants embraced the convenience of automated
functions, such as allowing web email servers to automatically
store email addresses of frequent contacts.
Most participants’ initial approach toward online security
was to trust that the default configurations are secure. Few
participants mentioned looking out for browser security in-
dicators, such as the lock icon or website certificates. When
asked about decision-making, participants did not frequently
engage in discussions of security and privacy until potential
online risks were specifically brought up. Most participants
reported using the Internet by simply trusting the way it is.
“One keeps hearing about Internet security and all
this, but unless something happens, you don’t pay a
lot of attention to it.” – P12
2) Having Diverse Areas of Concern: Although their de-
fault approach was to view the Internet as secure, most
participants were able to elaborate areas of specific concern
regarding the security and privacy of their data. Among these
areas were concerns about personal privacy, financial safety,
and freedom of speech.
Personal privacy was a major concern that was brought up
repeatedly during the interviews. Participants discussed privacy
concerns about sharing information with both online services
and other users of those services (and often conflated these
two threats).
“I just kind of like the idea of not being very trace-
able, not because I’m hiding something specifically
but because it’s my own business kind of, where I
am, what people I’m seeing.” – P14
Some participants were aware of data collection but were
ignoring the implications or did not perceive this as a threat.
However, other participants acknowledged the necessity of
disclosing personal information. For example, P5 stated that
“sometimes we have to be checked by other people” (referring
to public security). Others regarded the purpose of the Internet
as being to share information, and said that curtailing this
sharing would render their online presence less meaningful.
“If someone knows where I worked, that’s not a
problem because it actually helps me connect with
other people.” – P15
A major concern repeatedly mentioned was financial se-
curity. Many participants discussed security concerns around
online banking and shopping. For example, many participants
declined to allow websites to store their credit card informa-
tion.
Regarding freedom of speech, a few were concerned about
unforeseen consequences of disclosing their opinions.
“I don’t really trust that [my words] might not one
day be used against me... a lot of this information is
stored and it’s just uncomfortable.” – P14
3) Relying on Multiple Trust Factors: When discussing
how they decided to trust websites, participants mentioned
a variety of factors. Most participants associated website
trustworthiness with subjective impressions, such as familiarity
of brand presentation, the website interface, and the past
experiences of themselves and friends. Even knowledgeable
participants admitted to relying on such non-technical cues.
“The first [thing I notice] would be the brand, the
logo itself [...] does it look the same?” – P2
One major trust factor was the company’s reputation. For
example, when asked about why they trust particular storage
services, some participants relied on the brand name: “I
think having Apple’s name behind it, it’s quite safe.” (P3)
Participants also listed firms like Google and Amazon as their
trusted service providers. Many preferred to avoid unknown
shopping websites and rely on payment services with buyer
protection policies (e.g., PayPal).
In addition to their own previous experiences, participants
also relied on experience from friends or website reviews to
judge whether websites were trustworthy. These social cues
were used to help discern trustworthiness.
“[How do you choose where to shop online?] ...
usually based on the community. [. . . ] I always try
to think or to ask friends if they have ever bought
something in that website.” – P10
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4) Taking Risks for Practicality: Most participants de-
scribed heuristics for decision making based on their trust
factors and concerns. These included using pseudonyms, pro-
viding fake profile information, avoiding saving credit card
information, and only buying from known vendors.
However, participants often admitted to making exceptions
for practical reasons. They justified these decisions by dis-
cussing the acceptability or manageability of the potential
risks, e.g., a small financial risk when ordering from an
untrustworthy merchant. Such decisions often depended on the
urgency of the matter at hand.
“If I’m doing stuff on the Internet, I just want it done
as fast as possible so I can do something else.” – P14
Compromises were thus often made in the presence of
security warnings. Users put themselves in insecure situations
(e.g., by ignoring certificate warnings) to ensure convenience
and access to online services. In such situations, participants
described a tradeoff between personal security and service
accessibility when making their decisions. Though security
compromises were made, participants mentioned various sec-
ondary measures to reinforce their decisions, such as obtaining
tangible proofs of their transactions (“I want to have photocopy
or paper as proof” –P1) or contacting customer service.
5) Helplessness and Learning from Consequences: When
discussing their decision-making processes and concerns, par-
ticipants often expressed frustration over missing information
or knowledge that prevented them from behaving securely.
Many expressed a kind of learned helplessness relating to their
inability to understand security measures.
Another aspect of this helplessness originated from users’
inability to affect corporate policy and their lack of control
over where sensitive data is stored. One participant told us that
“a company could say one thing and do another thing” (P2),
suggesting their lack of control and distrust in the companies.
However, though participants expressed a lack of content-
ment about not being able to control the security of their
information, some mentioned that having that control could
be a burden to them.
“If location would be available for me, I would have
a feeling that from that time I am the one who has
to be responsible for that.” – P7
We also noticed that some users seemed to have eventually
developed a helpless attitude, and described the process of
making decisions online as akin to taking a leap of faith: “I
make a wish... I wish nothing happens” (P6).
D. The Process of Decision-Making
There was considerable variation in how individual partic-
ipants made trust decisions in online and real-life scenarios.
Our participants described many elements for decision-making,
and they were left to combine these elements into each single
decision. We identified a model of how users reach a security-
related decision based on various considerations.
The user’s decision-making process begins by incorporat-
ing the materials used by the user to determine the trustwor-
thiness of a website: their default trust, their varying concerns
about security and privacy, the list of factors that give them
confidence, their past experiences in similar situations, and the
demands of the primary task. During decision-making, certain
elements outweigh others, and the user must obtain a single
decision that combines all of their priorities, concerns, and
trust. In our interviews, participants seemed unable to give
clear descriptions of exactly how they weighted these varying
considerations, and it was clear that there was a complex
personal calculus that formed each decision [25]. However,
users did often describe the tensions of having to make a single
decision from an overload of information (and sometimes, a
lack of relevant information).
Following this decision, its consequences (e.g., improved
security, identify theft) may impact not only a single user
but also their friends and family as other users look for
information to feed into their own decision-making processes.
If the user chose not to trust a website, they might have a
primary task that remains incomplete, and still be looking for
ways to accomplish that task. If they did trust the website,
and no security problems result, they may relate that positive
experience in user reviews or feedback to other users. In other
situations, the exact consequences may be unclear, but the
experience of having to make that decision may feed into
feelings of a lack of a control or learned helplessness.
E. The Role of Website Locations
In the final segment of our interviews, we briefly explained
the concept of location-based website authentication to partic-
ipants, and asked them for feedback about how they thought it
could (or could not) be useful. Users were primed to discuss
security in this part of the interview, but since our goal was to
design a tool for users, we wanted to understand their desires.
Unsurprisingly, participants had not typically related web-
site locations to Internet security. Similar to previous find-
ings [21], they were mostly unaware of the geographic lo-
cations where their data was stored. Several speculated that
data must be stored in the same countries where the parent
companies were based. These responses were sensible and ex-
pected since the Internet abstracts away the physical locations
of website content and data storage. Participants also mostly
conflated security (the authenticity of the website) with privacy
(where and how users’ data is stored or collected).
When asked about the presentation of location information,
most participants discussed the idea of location on the country
level (as opposed to the city or continent level). Participants
often brought up the legal implications of having data stored in
different countries (mainly in the context of financial informa-
tion). They also occasionally referred to public disclosures of
nation level surveillance programs (e.g., mass surveillance in
the USA) and other data-gathering concerns when discussing
where they avoided sharing or storing personal data.
“It is important to be sure they are stored in countries
with high security levels... legal regulations [on] who
is allowed to have access and under what conditions
someone could have access to such data. And in
Europe, I would say such [legal institutions] are on
a high standard.” – P11
Participants suggested that location can be incorporated
into existing security mechanisms for critical applications.
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(a) The flag indicator and popup.
(b) The location tip shown on
the initial visit to a website. By
default, it is displayed once per
website to prevent unecessary
obstruction to user experience.
(c) The warning when a website’s location has changed
Fig. 1: Features of LocationWatch, our location indicator.
“I think in the end it will be used everywhere because
it would be like an adapted protocol. I think for me
it would be useful [in] banking.” – P4
Participants often related website location to the impli-
cation of disclosing their data to the foreign governments.
Aside from security concerns due to server impersonation,
participants cared about how foreign governments could harm
their privacy when websites are hosted abroad.
Regarding trust factors, we noticed that participants were
more receptive to discussions of website locations as opposed
to traditional security solutions, such as public key certifi-
cates or authentication. Users had opinions about locations,
and were willing to discuss how they might relate website
locations to other information about countries or services. One
participants discussed the utility of location information in
relation to logistical concerns such as shipping and postage
when shopping online. Another participant wanted to be able
to consider environmental implications of web server locations,
and discussed her concerns about the damage inflicted by large
heat-generating data centers. Another participant mentioned a
similar concern, but related her desire to know that her data
was being stored in a location where workers were being
treated and paid fairly.
V. DESIGN OF LOCATIONWATCH
Based on our qualitative analysis, we developed a set of
design requirements for our location tool, LocationWatch.
LocationWatch is intended to act as a visual indicator to
inform users about the result of server location verification,
envisioned to use recently-proposed methods [2], [39]. We
implemented LocationWatch as a Chrome extension featuring
a flag indicator, a location tip, and a warning message. In real-
world deployment, LocationWatch would be incorporated into
existing security indicators; in this paper, we implemented
a prototype as a browser extension. Before website location
verification methods are widely deployed, LocationWatch can
use IP geolocation databases as a reference.
LocationWatch’s main features include a flag indicator,
a location tip, and a warning message. The flag indicator
(Figure 1a) is an icon near the address bar showing the flag of
the server’s residing country. It also shows more information
in a popup window when clicked by the user. The location
tip (Figure 1b) is a small window on the upper-right corner
of the web content that appears on the first visit to a website.
The warning message (Figure 1c) appears when a website’s
location has changed since the user’s previous visit and allows
the user to decide whether to continue visiting it. In the event of
a server impersonation attack (i.e., using a fraudulent certificate
or a compromised server’s private key), this tool would display
the location of the attacker’s server.
A. Design Rationale
We aimed to implement LocationWatch as an unobtrusive
and effective tool to assist users in assessing the inputs to
their decision. We discuss its potential integration with existing
security indicators in Section VII.
Default Trust. Since users often trust websites by default and
without understanding security indicators, security information
should be made intuitive for them. Some may even prefer not
to be bothered with location details since website security is
not their primary task. We therefore designed LocationWatch
to be non-intrusive by showing only the flag icon by default.
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Available indicators
Stage Tasks Website location Ctrl features Expt features
1 Dropbox: upload passport scan United States Flag Flag + Tip
Initial visit Facebook: update status Sweden Flag Flag + Tip
Banking: check 1st account balance Switzerland Flag Flag + Tip
2 Dropbox: upload password list United States Flag Flag (+ Tip*)
Re-visit Facebook: update status Sweden Flag Flag (+ Tip*)
without change Banking: check 2nd account balance Switzerland Flag Flag (+ Tip*)
3 Dropbox: upload credit card China Flag Flag + Warning
Re-visit Facebook: upload party photo United States Flag Flag + Warning
with change Banking: check 3rd account balance Japan Flag Flag + Warning
*The tip is only shown if the participant checked the “always remind me” option in Stage 1.
TABLE I: Study 2 tasks and location configuration for the control and experiment groups.
Diverse Concerns. Participants were often concerned about
how their data was used or misused by governing nations in
which the web servers reside. Since legal protection laws differ
across countries, the location of where data is stored or sent
may prompt different user concerns and influence subsequent
decision-making. We therefore designed a popup (Figure 1a)
that appears when the user clicks on the flag icon. This popup
shows the server’s governing country and information on that
country’s data protection laws for the users’ reference.
Trust Factors. Most participants did not initially think of
location as a trust factor. To strengthen users’ attention to
location, the location tip appears on the user’s initial visit to a
website (Figure 1b). While slightly obtrusive, this tip provides
an attentive user a first impression of where this website is
originally located and it is designed to only appear once by
default. We also use the popup window (Figure 1a) to show
more detailed information for interested users.
Past Experience. Previous experience plays an important role
since many participants considered the visual familiarity of
websites as a primary factor for trust. Therefore, we chose
to show a visual cue to inform the user when the website
location has changed. This is realized using a warning message
(Figure 1c) showing the current and previous website locations.
Practicality. Participants admitted to bypassing warnings for
practical reasons such as convenience or an acceptable level
of risk. Our location indicator does not prohibit such choices,
similar to certificate warnings. In the warning message, we
provided two buttons: “leave the website” and “proceed care-
fully” (Figure 1c).
VI. STUDY 2: USER EVALUATION
We conducted a user study to evaluate the impact of
website location on users’ decision-making. First, we aimed to
evaluate how users’ security behavior changes when website
locations are provided. Second, we aimed to evaluate the
usability of LocationWatch to see if it satisfied our design
concepts and requirements. Since the interviewed participants
mostly relied on experiences and impressions, we hypothesized
that website location changes across subsequent visits would
affect users’ decisions.
A. Study Design
To evaluate LocationWatch and users’ response to website
locations, we designed an experiment where participants used
three web services (file storage, social networking, and online
banking) and performed routine but potentially sensitive tasks.
We chose these services to prompt typical concerns from the
qualitative analysis: personal privacy, identity safety, and finan-
cial security. We aimed to measure how online behavior varied
when participants were given website location information
using LocationWatch.
Our study had a mixed design, where group was a between-
subjects factor and stage was a within-subjects factor. There
were two groups: control and experiment. In the control con-
dition, the location interface was configured to show only the
flag icon and the popup window (making it similar to existing
tools [12], [26]). In the experiment condition, participants
used the fully-featured version of LocationWatch, including
the location tip and the location change warning. The study
had three stages and in each stage the participant was asked
to perform three tasks, as shown in Table I. We used a
Latin square design to shuffle the task order across different
participants in each stage to avoid order effects.
Each participant was given a brief introduction to the
study’s purpose as a usability evaluation of a software tool.
All participants received the same tutorial on LocationWatch,
introducing the concept of geographic locations of websites,
the flag icon, and the popup features. To avoid priming
users to expect location changes, we did not introduce the
location tip and warning (only visible to the experiment group).
Participants were then given login information for the accounts
and files created for the study, and instructed to treat them as
if they were their own.
B. Selecting Test Locations
To evaluate user reactions to various locations, we pro-
grammed fake locations to be displayed by LocationWatch.
We configured our tool to show three types of locations:
countries associated with good privacy impressions (Sweden,
Switzerland, Japan), a developed country with prominently
reported data privacy breaches (the USA), and a developing
country with known Internet censorship (China). For the last
stage, we programmed LocationWatch to simulate location
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Fig. 2: Box plots of task completion scores across different
stages for all websites.2
changes: Dropbox from the USA to China, Facebook from
Sweden to the USA, and the online bank from Switzerland
to Japan. For the control group, this led to a change of the
country flag and popup contents. For the experiment group,
the location change warnings were additionally shown.
Any choice of countries would naturally subject our study
to various user-side cultural biases, and we therefore fixed the
country assignments across different participants rather than
randomizing them to minimize experiment variation. Since we
were focused on observing whether location plays a role at
all, we leave the design of a more large-scale and ecologically
valid study as future work.
Each session lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. In ad-
dition to the instrumented measurements about their activ-
ities, the participants completed three questionnaires: a de-
mographic questionnaire, a pre-test questionnaire about their
online decision-making habits, and a post-test questionnaire
about their impressions of LocationWatch.
C. Participants
We recruited users who were aged 18 years or above,
spoke English, and had Internet experiences, including online
banking, file storage, and email. 44 participants completed the
study (23 female and 21 male), most of whom were students
(32). They ranged in age from 20 to 59, with most (34)
being between 20 and 29 years old. Participants’ nationalities
spanned 17 countries and they had visited a median of 15
countries. They come from various backgrounds, including
social sciences, humanities, natural sciences, and engineering.
Each study lasted between 25 and 40 minutes.
D. Results
We evaluated participant behavior based on the number of
completed tasks and the decision-making time.
1) Task Completion: We recorded how often users com-
pleted the tasks in each stage and each condition of the exper-
iment, and used task completion as a measure of how location
affected participants’ behavior. We defined task completion as
having logged into the web service and completed the given
task. We encoded completed tasks as 1, and uncompleted tasks
2The notches in the box plots represent the 95% confidence intervals around
the median. When the intervals fall outside the 1st or 3rd quartiles, the notches
extend beyond the box.
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Fig. 3: Box plots of time spent deciding to log into websites,
averaged over all three websites in each stage.
as 0. For each stage we summed the scores from the three
websites to produce an aggregate score between 0 and 3.
Figure 2 shows the distributions of completion scores.
While most control group participants completed all tasks in all
stages, fewer experiment group participants completed the task
when the location changed. Descriptive statistics are detailed
in Table II in the appendix.
We first looked for differences in task completion between
the control and experiment groups. Since task completion
was based on counts, we performed a between-subjects Chi-
squared test on the sum of completion scores across all stages
and found a significant difference between the two conditions
(χ2(1) = 9.44, p = 0.002). Post-hoc pairwise Chi-squared
tests using a Bonferroni correction showed that this difference
occurred in Stage 3 (χ2(1) = 10.52, p = 0.011), where the
warning made participants in the experiment group less likely
to complete the task.
In the absence of an omnibus test for categorical data, we
conducted Chi-squared tests to look for differences between
the stages in each condition. We found a significant effect of
stages in the experiment group (χ2(2) = 30.86, p < 0.001),
but no effect in the control group (χ2(2) = 7.35, p = 0.228).
Table III in the appendix shows the results of post-hoc pairwise
Chi-squared tests. We found significant differences in task
completion between Stage 1 and Stage 3 (χ2(1) = 26.15, p <
0.001), and between Stage 2 and Stage 3 (χ2(1) = 10.52, p =
0.011) for the experiment group, showing that the warning
for location changes significantly affected whether participants
completed critical tasks.
2) Decision-Making Times: As an indication of how much
attention participants paid to making decisions about location,
we recorded the time taken in the login process. We measured
the time between when the webpage loaded and when the
user clicked the login button (in seconds). This measurement
included the time that the user spent deliberating about whether
to login. We aggregated the times for each participant in each
stage by taking the mean of the times for the three websites.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of times across the three stages.
Table IV in the appendix shows descriptive statistics of the
times that participants took to log in by group and stage. The
times in Stages 1 and 2 were similar across the two groups,
the times decreased in Stage 2 (from ∼30 seconds to ∼17
seconds). In Stage 3, the experiment group spent more time
considering their login decision (54 seconds).
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We used a mixed two-way ANOVA to analyze the differ-
ences in login times between the two conditions and between
the stages. There were significant effects of both condition
(F (1, 41) = 12.73, p < 0.001) and stage (F (2, 82) =
9.92, p < 0.001) and a significant interaction between con-
dition and stage (F (2, 82) = 10.65, p < 0.001).
We then used post-hoc pairwise t-tests to examine the
differences between the two groups. There were significant
differences only in Stage 3 (t(21) = −3.08, p = 0.051),
implying that the warning made the experiment group spend
more time than the control group.
We further conducted post-hoc pairwise t-tests with a
Bonferroni correction to look for differences within each group
(Table V in the appendix). There were significant differences
between Stages 1 and 2 for both conditions (t(21) = 6.01, p <
0.001 for control, t(21) = 7.24, p < 0.001 for experiment),
possibly because the participants got used to the login process.
The experiment group had significantly different login times
between Stages 2 and 3 (t(21) = −3.43, p = 0.023), implying
that the warning affected their time spent deciding to log in.
3) Task Completion on Different Websites: We aggregated
completion scores within the same stage in our initial task
completion analysis. Here, we performed an exploratory anal-
ysis to investigate how users reacted to different location
changes on different websites. The scale of our study prevented
us from exhaustively testing different websites and locations.
However, in our study design we attempted to pick security-
sensitive websites, and to choose location changes that might
represent different attacks. We included location changes to
countries that were neutral but implausible (Switzerland to
Japan, banking), locations with well-publicized privacy issues
(USA to China, Dropbox), and changes between plausible lo-
cations (Sweden to USA, Facebook). Our exploratory analysis
evaluates whether there was an effect of website (and the
corresponding country change) on task completion.
Similar to analyzing task completion across stages, we
defined a participant’s task completion score for each website,
ranging between 0 (no tasks completed) and 3 (tasks completed
in all websites). The distributions of website task completion
scores for the control and the experiment groups are shown
in Figure 4. In both conditions, participants completed fewer
tasks on Dropbox (Table VI in the appendix).
A Chi-squared test using a Bonferroni correction showed
a significant effect of website in both the control condition
(χ2(2) = 29.17, p < 0.001) and the experiment condition
(χ2(2) = 32.07, p < 0.001). Post-hoc pairwise tests revealed
that in both conditions, significantly fewer participants com-
pleted the tasks on Dropbox than on Facebook or banking, as
shown in Table VII in the appendix.
4) Usability: We used the System Usability Scale [9] to
evaluate the usability of our location interface. Both variants
of our interface were ranked as “excellent” (scores greater
than 80) [30]. The average scores were 81.61 for the control
group and 82.2 for the experiment group. A Mann-Whitney
test showed no significant difference in usability between the
two versions (U = 254.5, p = 0.78).
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E. Summary
Participants’ decisions were indeed affected by their knowl-
edge and perception of the websites’ locations. There were
statistically significant behavior changes in task completion
when website locations changed in the experiment condition.
This suggested that participants noticed the changes and some
avoided sensitive tasks. Participants who completed the tasks
despite location changes mainly cited the website’s reputation
as the main reason.
We also noticed that when warned of website location
changes, two users in the experiment group still signed in to
inspect the website (Facebook and Dropbox) before refusing
to perform the given task. This suggests that for some users,
the decision point for personal security or privacy lies past the
sign-in process. This supports previous work on browser warn-
ings [31] that prevent users from leaking personal credentials
before ascertaining their trustworthiness. It also suggests that
security indicators could be more useful if they were presented
right before critical tasks.
LocationWatch did not interrupt users in non-critical cases
since both groups took similar times in the login process in
Stages 1 and 2. There was a significant difference in Stage
3, during which warnings were shown to the experiment
group participants, who took extra time to look up reference
information or decide whether to proceed. Combined with the
task completion, this showed that the tool managed to attract
users’ attention with the warning message.
We also found preliminary evidence that location infor-
mation may have increased significance in tasks involving
sensitive data. Significantly fewer participants completed the
Dropbox tasks, citing that they did not feel comfortable upload-
ing personal information in such situations. However, many
participants still logged in despite warnings in the banking
task, which our interview results showed to be the most
sensitive. It is difficult to know exactly why this occurred,
but it suggests that participants interpret location information
differently in different contexts.
Our evaluation also showed that LocationWatch was us-
able. The SUS scores were good and similar for both groups,
implying that the version with the location change warning
was as usable as existing solutions, which primarily show the
country flag (as in the control group).
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VII. DISCUSSION
The results of our studies suggest that website location is
a promising research direction for helping users authenticate
websites. We discuss various aspects of using website location
as a factor for users to relate to their security and privacy.
A. Adoption and Deployment
With the trend of data localization [7], location verification
could become an important consideration for data center
deployment, which is presently concerned with infrastructure
and sustainability [37]. Companies often host their websites
using content delivery networks (CDNs), which serve data
from servers closer to the clients (often to the same city or
region). We envision that market and regulatory pressure would
encourage companies to choose CDNs in preferred locations.
We see the beginnings of this with EV certificates [10], which
contain verified information about company office locations.
The security benefits of automatic and verifiable location
information would further encourage wider adoption.
For real-world deployment, website owners could opt in
to provide detailed and up-to-date location information upon
client connection, as a service to provide extra security assur-
ance. We envision that LocationWatch would store legitimate
server locations for each supported website, which might
consist of multiple locations. If the tool detects that the website
is being served from an unlisted location, it would display
a warning similar to that in LocationWatch. We found that
users’ security awareness could be raised by such warnings,
allowing them to take further caution with their private data.
B. Challenges of Location Authentication
One challenge with any added security mechanism is that
it may distract or overwhelm users, who in response bypass
or ignore warnings, and this has been addressed with ongoing
research [14]. We implemented LocationWatch as a separate
tool to minimize the influence of other TLS warnings in our
studies. However, we envision that it could be integrated with
existing indicators to provide users with security information
in a consolidated manner.
There are also challenges inherited from location-based
authentication techniques due to the Internet infrastructure.
First, it is likely that many websites are physically hosted on
the same CDN server. This allows an attacker that compro-
mises a website to host a phishing website on the same CDN,
effectively serving arbitrary content from the same location.
This attack is not detectable in the currently proposed location-
verification protocols [2], [39] since the location ceases to be a
unique factor of the website for verification. However, critical
websites can resist such attacks if they host their login web
pages on privately owned data centers. The warnings of our
location indicator are effective only if the TLS endpoint of the
website is served from unique and private locations.
Another limitation of location-based authentication stems
from the use of third-party resources (like CSS and JavaScript),
which can be served from other locations. Like current security
indicators, LocationWatch shows the location of the top-level
web server, while the locations of embedded content are not
displayed. This is a design choice made to avoid confusing
users, as they typically view complete webpages and do not
consider individual webpage elements. Creating a design that
allows users to explore the locations of individual elements in
a single page is an open challenge.
Adversarial co-location and third-party resources are fun-
damental limitations of recent location-based authentication
mechanisms. While our exploration of location as a security
factor inherits such limitations, we found that there is potential
for location information as a comprehensible security indicator.
C. Study Limitations
This type of work is unavoidably affected by participants’
views. We conducted our studies in person to obtain richer
data about users’ interactions with LocationWatch and how
they perceived the warnings. However, it limited the diversity
of perspectives that we captured (both in terms of participants
and the number of websites and locations we could present). In
future work, it would be interesting to conduct a larger study
using crowdsourcing platforms to evaluate location’s influence
and a more global perspective.
Our study was also affected by the aforementioned chal-
lenges of location-based authentication. However, the in-
person experiments allowed us to interactively observe users
and their diverse contingent actions (e.g., retroactively deleting
files or reasoning about warnings).
VIII. CONCLUSION
Authenticating websites is an important problem that af-
fects users because they must make decisions about whether
a website is trustworthy. The current certificate model forces
users to interpret dense and unfamiliar technical information,
which results in users expressing confusion about warnings
or ignoring them in favor of non-technical cues [13]. Recent
proposals suggest the addition of web server location authen-
tication [2], [39] to strengthen TLS. Our work is the first to
explore the usability aspects of these proposals. We investi-
gated how location information can fit into users’ decision-
making processes, and whether location information affects
the decisions that users make about security-sensitive tasks.
We designed LocationWatch, a browser extension to no-
tify users of website locations and their changes. We conducted
a user study and found that when alerted to a location change,
users understood the change and interpreted it in light of their
current task. As a result, they were less likely to complete
security-sensitive tasks when warned about location changes.
Our findings suggest that website location indication has the
potential to be a usable approach to helping users make
informed decisions about privacy and security.
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APPENDIX
We attach our semi-structured interview script here. We
prepared the following interview questions to ask participants
about their Internet use, location and security awareness, and
preferences on location.
Online Storage
1. Do you use online file storage services (e.g., Dropbox, Apple
iCloud, Google Drive)? Could you mention some examples of
how you use it?
2. What kinds of data do you store online? Are there types
of data that you typically try not to put on the Internet?
3. Is there any information about yourself that you specif-
ically try not to store on the Internet?
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Email, Calendars, Contacts
4. Do you use online calendars like the Google Calendar, or
the iCloud calendar? Can you elaborate on the types of events
you mark on your calendar that you store online?
5. Do you use a web-based email service? What do you
use it for?
6. Do you store your contact information online? What
kinds of information do you store?
Finance and Shopping
7. Do you use online banking? Could you mention some
examples of how you use it? E.g., just checking your balance,
transferring funds, stocks investment or financial planning.
8. Do you use your credit card to shop online?
9. How do you choose where to shop online? What kind
of considerations are likely to make you trust an online store?
Will it make a difference to you if you know you can access
a brick-and-mortar branch of that store?
10. When you are shopping online, how would you feel if
store’s domain indicates a foreign country?
11. What kind of precautions do you take around handling
financial transactions online (whether with credit cards or
online banking)? Do you store your credit card information
online?
12. Are there any aspects of financial management that you
would not feel comfortable performing online?
Social Networking
13. Do you use social networking or messenger services, such
as Facebook, Google Plus, Twitter, Instagram, etc.? This may
also include messaging services like WhatsApp.
14. Is there a difference in the kind of information you
share to different platforms? What kind of considerations do
you make before putting your information on different types
of social media?
15. What are your concerns regarding your privacy on
social networking websites, such as Facebook, Twitter, or
Instagram?
Knowledge of Locations
16. When you store your files (photos, videos, documents)
online, where do you think these files are stored?
17. When you visit a website, such as Wikipedia, Google
Maps, or Yahoo News, where do you think the web content is
stored?
18. When you visit a website, such as online banking or
online storage, how do you know you are actually visiting
the real website, as opposed to a forged website to steal your
personal information? Are there particular indicators that you
pay attention to?
Internet Service Location Preferences
Interviewer: We’ve so far talked about a lot of things you can
do using the Internet. A lot of these services store your data in
data centers located somewhere in the world. Companies also
use these data centers to store information that you consume,
such as news articles. Let’s talk about your trust or various
preferences regarding these data centers.
1. What are your privacy concerns about your data online?
This might include files stored online, personal information,
or credit cards?
2. Do you have any concerns about where your data are
being stored? What kind of concerns? For example, where
would you like your data to be stored?
3. Does your preference of where your data is stored
depend on the type of data? Specifically, consider the following
types of data: your banking account data, online shopping
history, chats, emails, social networking data, hotel or flight
bookings, etc.
4. Imagine that you are provided with information regard-
ing the location of where your online services are. How would
such information influence your trust in these services?
5. What kind of location information do you have in
mind? How detailed would you prefer such information to be
presented?
6. Imagine that the location information can be presented to
you when you visit a website. How do you think this location
information should be displayed?
7. If you had location information available to you, in what
kind of services do you think it would be useful?
Control Experiment
Stage Mean Mdn SD Mean Mdn SD
1 2.82 3 0.50 2.73 3 0.63
2 2.55 3 0.60 2.32 2 0.65
3 2.32 3 0.84 1.45 2 0.96
TABLE II: Descriptive statistics of task completion across
different stages.
Control Experiment
Stages χ2 df p χ2 df p
All 7.35 2 0.228 30.86 2 < 0.001
S1 vs. S2 – – – 3.62 1 0.513
S1 vs. S3 – – – 26.15 1 < 0.001
S2 vs. S3 – – – 10.52 1 0.011
TABLE III: Chi-squared tests of task completion across differ-
ent stages using the Bonferroni correction. We did not perform
pairwise tests on the control condition since we found no
significant differences between all the stages.
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Cond Stage Mean Mdn SD Skew Kurtosis
Ctrl
1 33.77 28 13.13 0.61 -0.35
2 16.83 17 4.22 -0.59 1.44
3 18.29 14 16.91 3.01 10.93
Expt
1 34.32 33 8.61 0.85 0.86
2 16.64 15 6.63 0.30 -0.88
3 54.02 41 45.12 1.11 0.77
TABLE IV: Descriptive statistics of decision-making times.
Control Experiment
Stages t df p t df p
S1 vs. S2 6.01 21 <0.001 7.24 21 <0.001
S1 vs. S3 3.52 21 0.019 -1.74 21 0.868
S2 vs. S3 -0.43 21 1.000 -3.43 21 0.023
TABLE V: t-tests of decision-making times across different
stages using the Bonferroni correction.
Control Experiment
Website Mean Mdn SD Mean Mdn SD
Bank 2.95 3 0.21 2.64 3 0.49
Facebook 2.73 3 0.70 2.45 3 0.96
Dropbox 2.00 3 1.15 1.14 1 0.91
TABLE VI: Descriptive statistics of task completion across
different websites.
Control Experiment
Tasks χ2 df p χ2 df p
All 29.17 2 <0.001 32.07 2 <0.001
B vs. FB 2.41 1 0.962 0.53 1 1.000
B vs. DB 21.06 1 <0.001 23.32 1 <0.001
FB vs. DB 10.20 1 0.011 15.99 1 <0.001
TABLE VII: Chi-squared tests of task completion across
different websites using the Bonferroni correction.
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